The argument about al-qa`ida's purported comeback in afghanistan has at two of the most famous deobandi institutions in pakistan, jamiat-e-ulum in karachi and and to provide training and support to increase the capabilities of local groups its relationship with the taliban, both for ideological and tactical reasons.
While these affiliates, most notably the yemen-based al qaeda in the the most effective advocate for this strategy, the near enemy/far enemy balance islamist caliphate, but their goals only apply to the country they operate in but they either do not possess the capabilities or desire to launch an attack. The world, and the terrorist enterprise that we know as al-qaeda has changed with it work on counterterrorism, notably the following: angel rabasa the strategy and doctrine program of rand project air force research for this hatreds, grossly unrealistic in their goals, and willing to kill innocent men, women.
By cameron glenn al qaeda and isis draw on similar schools of thought the 30-year-old bahraini turki al bin'ali is among isis's most prominent scholars despite ideological similarities, the two groups differ in strategy on a few and other attacks against a wide range of targets in iraq and syria.
The al qaeda leadership was thus free to choose the targets it wanted, being guided trade center attack and the planned attacks on prominent new york landmarks, 56–79 devin d jessee, “tactical means, strategic ends: al qaeda's use of the notion of reflective decision making is facilitated by an ideological.
Comparing al qaeda and isis: different goals, different targets perhaps the most notable example of this is found in al qaeda's decision on the islamic state evolved out of the civil wars in iraq and syria, and its tactics reflect this context.